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Abstract. This paper argues that the “Economics of Crime” concentrates too 
much on punishment as a policy to fight crime, which is unwise for several 
reasons. There are important instances in which punishment simply cannot 
reduce crime. Several feasible alternatives to punishment exist, such as 
offering positive incentives or handing out awards for law abiding behavior. 
These alternative approaches tend to create a positive sum environment. When 
people appreciate living in a society that is to a large extent law abiding, they 
are more motivated to observe the law. 
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I. PUNISHMENT’S PROMINENT ROLE 
When Gary Becker in his 1968 article founded the modern “Economics of 
Crime,” he called it “Crime and Punishment” (Becker 1968). The basic idea is 
that rational individuals systematically respond to changes in relative prices: 
the higher the expected punishment, the lower the crime rate, cet. par. This is 
an important insight because under many conditions the only feasible and 
effective possibility of fighting criminal behavior is indeed to punish the 
offenders.1 In all societies throughout the years, punishment has been widely, 
if not exclusively, used as a means of deterring people from committing 
criminal acts. An important issue has been the identification of causality; that 
is, higher punishment tends to reduce crime; however, when crime is high, 
there is a tendency to increase punishment (see Ehrlich and Brower 1987; 
Levitt 1996, 1997; and Donohue and Levitt 2001). The causality issue has 
been approached by using laboratory experiments (e.g., DeAngelo and 
Charness 2009). Recently, ingenious natural experiments have been used to 
deal with the causality problem; for example, Drago, Galbaiati, and Vertova 
(2009) found a robust deterrent effect of punishment on crime for individual 
data. 
 The Economics of Crime distinguishes two effects of punishment. The 
first is the deterrence effect of imposing costs on criminals who are 
apprehended, and the second is the incapacitation effect, which suggests that 
criminals thrown into prison, or suffering a death sentence, are no longer able 
to pursue their illegal activities. Prison sentences are, of course, not the only 
punishment possible. A less severe punishment is probation, which has been 
shown to have mixed effects on recidivism (Engel et al. 2009). 
                                                
1 See, for example, Stigler 1970; Ehrlich 1973; Polinsky and Shavell 1979; Cameron 
1988; Allen 1996; Ehrlich 1996; Levitt 1998; Freeman 1999; Corman and Mocan 2000; Eide 
2000; Bourguignon 2001; Merlo 2004; Mocan and Rees 2005. Recently, behavioral or 
psychologically inspired approaches have been used, for example, Garoupa 2003. 
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 The Economics of Crime has been extended in various ways. It 
suffices to mention three particularly interesting aspects: 
1. The concept of punishment has been generalized to include the psychic 
costs to offenders by shaming them. Persons committing criminal acts are 
actively revealed to the general populace. As a result, their reputation is 
diminished, thus making it more costly for them to be accepted as (trading) 
partners by other people because of an innate distrust of criminals. A 
somewhat different type of shaming consists of directly confronting the 
perpetrators with their victims, thereby imposing psychic costs 
(Braithwaite 1989; see also Brennan and Pettit 2004). The murderer of a 
family’s father, for example, is forced to experience the immense loss 
suffered by the widow and children of his victim.2 A related approach is 
the stigmatization of offenders, which works through a reduction of wages 
offered by employers (Funk 2004). 
2. Punishment to some extent is effective even if it is not enforced. 
Punishment serves as a signal to indicate what behavior is considered 
undesirable by lawmakers. Such expressive punishment may be the only 
possible action when it is impossible to monitor and impose punishment, 
except at an unreasonably high cost.3 An example is the widespread 
custom of spitting in public places—a behavior that used to be common in 
Western countries until the middle of the 20th century and which is still 
common in many Asian countries. A similar activity is littering (see 
Torgler, Frey, and Wilson 2009). 
3. A third extension of the Economics of Crime is the so-called broken 
window theory.4 The idea is that unlawful behavior should not be tolerated. 
                                                
2 It may be argued that such shaming only works for one-time offenders, but not for 
professional criminals. 
3 For the concept of “expressive law,” see Hedman 1991; Cooter 1998; Bohnet and 
Cooter 2005. 
4 See Wilson and Kelling 1982; Skogan 1990; Kelling and Coles 1996; Gladwell 2000; 
Corman and Mocan 2005; Beckenkamp et al. 2009. The concept of “broken windows” was 
inspired by the field experiments undertaken by Zimbardo (1969). 
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One interpretation of this theory is that even perpetrators of minor 
misdemeanors must be immediately and severely punished in order to 
effectively deter people from deviating from the law. A similar approach is 
the three-strikes-out concept, which supports life imprisonment even for 
minor criminal acts if the offender repeats the act more than twice.5 The 
problem is that such an approach tends to violate the principle of marginal 
deterrence. If this condition is not met, a potential criminal has an 
incentive to commit a worse crime because the expected marginal benefits 
to the offender are likely to be positive while the marginal punishment 
remains constant. This insight is obvious to economists, but has often been 
ignored in practice. In particular, authoritarian governments and 
dictatorships often seek to deter crime by imposing very harsh 
punishments for even minor crimes. The predictable result is that the 
incidence of crime is low, but once a crime is committed it tends to be 
significant. The perpetrators correctly reckon that if a minor crime gets the 
same punishment as a major one (e.g., the death penalty) they may as well 
go for the larger crime with higher expected profits. Once the threshold of 
three criminal acts is surpassed and given that there is a maximum penalty 
(either life imprisonment or death), increasingly serious crimes come at no 
additional cost. Take tax evasion as an example: if even minor violations 
of the tax code are heavily punished, it pays to conceal really large 
amounts. The verdict on the effectiveness of the broken window theory is 
open. Some observers are convinced that it is an effective deterrent, while 
others are more skeptical (e.g., Corman and Mocan 2005; National 
Research Council 2004). 
                                                
5 See Tyler and Boeckmann 1997; Clark, Austin, and Henry 1997. 
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II. PUNISHMENT DOES NOT ALWAYS WORK 
While punishment is the cornerstone of the Economics of Crime, it should be 
acknowledged that it is sometimes inapplicable, inefficient, or even 
counterproductive. 
A. Punishment Is Desired by the Perpetrators 
There are conditions in which a punishment imposed for an illegal act 
constitutes a benefit, rather than a cost, to the perpetrator. Suicidal terrorists 
who want to die are an extreme example.6 Trying to deter them even with the 
threat of capital punishment is ineffective; they want to be heroes or martyrs 
for their cause. Similarly, gang members want to be punished by the police 
because this is a signal to the other gang members that they really belong—the 
more severe the punishment, the clearer the signal. Still, it can be argued that 
the incapacitation effect works, although this applies to the perpetrators 
themselves and has little or no effect on others who would like to excel 
similarly in such illegal activities.7 The evidence suggests that in many 
terrorist organizations the supply of people willing to die for their cause is 
abundant (e.g., Krueger 2008). Eliminating the top echelon of a terrorist 
movement or drug cartel is ineffective if the demand for the respective 
“services” (i.e., the terrorist cause or the provision of drugs) remains 
unchanged. It simply means that the positions are empty thus enabling others 
to step in. 
                                                
6 Not all suicidal terrorists really choose voluntarily to die. Often they are manipulated by 
a terrorist organization. See Krueger 2008; Frey 2004. 
7 One often hears of gang leaders and members continuing their illegal activities while in 
jail, for example, the American and Sicilian Mafia or the drug barons in Columbia (Gambetta 
1993). 
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B. Punishment Reduces Legal Opportunities 
When an individual has been punished, it is often taken as a signal that the 
individual is not trustworthy. As a result, that individual usually finds it 
difficult or even impossible to find employment in legitimate sectors and is 
induced to turn once again to illegal activities. 
C. The Maximum Punishment Is Too Low 
There are conditions in which the expected punishment for committing a 
crime is lower than the expected benefits of doing so. If a rational comparison 
of expected benefits and costs indeed guides behavior, this produces an 
incentive to engage in criminal activities. In countries observing fundamental 
human rights, the maximum punishment is the death sentence or life 
imprisonment because torture is unacceptable. Civil rights groups have argued 
that putting people to death or keeping them in prison for life should be 
stopped. This position enlarges the scope for crime provided that people 
function according to the expected utility calculus. 
D. Punishment Serves to Educate Criminals 
Young criminals often learn the tricks and techniques of their trade from more 
seasoned inmates in prisons. Once released, they can engage more 
productively in committing further crimes. This problem is well-known, but 
nevertheless endemic. 
E. Punishing the Innocent 
In real life, it is practically impossible to punish all the guilty and never punish 
an innocent person. In many cases, innocent people are punished while the 
guilty are not (errors of Type I and II). There is a trade-off: the more one tries 
to catch all violators of the law, the more likely it is that one also punishes 
innocent people. The incentive effects may be disastrous. If people realize that 
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they incur a substantial risk of being punished even if they follow the law, 
they have a strong incentive to at least also reap the benefits of acting illegally. 
A pertinent example is tax evasion. If honest people end up being punished for 
nothing, it pays to conceal as much as possible and take your chances. 
F. Unwillingness to Impose the Optimal Punishment 
The Economics of Crime generally assumes that the government and the legal 
system have an interest in imposing optimal negative sanctions. This is not 
necessarily the case. If, for instance, the politicians in power undertake 
unlawful acts or have done so in the past, they may find it beneficial to 
establish suboptimal punishments in case their actions are detected. Interest 
groups as well as public opinion may also have a strong influence on what 
punishments are legal and actually imposed by judges. Moreover, in many 
countries, the president has the power to reduce or undo a punishment at will. 
This privilege is often used for political and private reasons, even in countries 
otherwise bound to the rule of law. 
G. Crowding Out Intrinsic Motivation 
Empirical research has convincingly established that it is impossible to 
account for the extent of tax paying by only considering the expected 
punishment.8 The crucial question is not why people do not pay their taxes, but 
rather “Why is there so little cheating?” (See Alm 1996; for surveys, see 
Torgler 2007; Andreoni, Erard, and Feinstein 1998.) To some extent, paying 
one’s taxes is a “quasi-voluntary” act (see Levi 1988) attributable to an 
intrinsic motivation to contribute to the burden of taxation. Risk aversion is 
not able to account for the extent of taxes paid in the United States and 
Switzerland. The Arrow-Pratt measure of risk aversion would have to be no 
less than 30 in order to account for the actual compliance rates, but empirical 
                                                
8 Torgler 2001, 2007; Feld and Tyran 2002; Feld and Frey 2002, 2007; Frey and Torgler 
2007. 
  7 
measures of risk aversion lie between 1 and 2; that is, they are substantially 
lower (Graetz and Wilde 1985; Alm, McClelland, and Schulze 1992; R.L. 
Frey and Torgler 2002). An unfair, inconsiderate way of treating taxpayers—
punishing honest taxpayers by error—tends to undermine this tax morale. The 
net effect of using punishment in an effort to establish legal behavior is 
counterproductive if the relative price effect of the punishment is smaller than 
the crowding-out effect. The conditions under which this happens have been 
identified.9 
H. Unconscious Behavior 
There are instances in which people violate the law but are not aware of it. As 
Bazerman, Loewenstein, and Moore (2002) argue for the case of accountants 
violating the law, punishing such people has no effect because they are not 
aware of any wrongdoing and are therefore unable to correct their behavior. 
 These considerations show that punishment, while important in many 
situations, fails under other conditions. It is therefore important to seriously 
consider alternatives to punishment in order to maintain a society built on the 
rule of law. 
III. CONSIDERING ALTERNATIVES TO PUNISHMENT 
While focusing on punishment as a deterrent, the Economics of Crime does 
not totally neglect other incentives. However, in typical econometric analyses, 
only a few incentives other than punishment are considered,10 in particular, the 
impact of the state of employment and education. It has been shown that a 
reduction in unemployment opens new opportunities for individuals to find 
employment in the legitimate as opposed to the shadow economy, and this 
                                                
9 For theoretical and empirical analyses of motivational crowding theory, see Frey 1992; 
Frey 1997; Bénabou and Tirole 2003; Frey and Jegen 2001. 
10 See the works cited in note 1. 
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reduces crime. Better-educated people can more easily earn a good income in 
legal activities and therefore are somewhat immune to many kinds of crime.11 
 The incentives considered by the Economics of Crime refer to 
monetary incentives in the legal as opposed to the illegal sector. However, 
there are other incentives to be considered going beyond monetary 
opportunities for people deciding to be active in either the legal or the illegal 
society. It suffices to mention two such incentives little considered in the 
literature. 
A. Positive Non-monetary Incentives to Leave Crime 
An important motivation to give up a life of crime is to have an opportunity to 
reenter the lawful part of society without undue costs. In most legal systems, 
people wanting to return to a legitimate activity often are faced with extremely 
high costs or are totally excluded. They serve the sentences for their crimes, 
but even after serving their sentences they are precluded from many legal 
activities. As a result, they are trapped in the illegitimate sector and are forced 
to continue their activity there. At the same time, the people wanting to stay in 
the illegitimate sector impose heavy barriers to exit because they fear that 
those leaving would be willing to provide the police with evidence. 
 A totally different approach considers the situation of people engaged 
in unlawful activities and seeks to raise the benefits of exiting by providing 
such persons with attractive opportunities in the lawful sector: they are not 
punished; instead, they are offered a new identity and satisfactory employment 
options so that they can start a new life. Such a policy flies in the face of what 
is normally considered fair because past crimes are not sanctioned. However, 
when going beyond the primitive urge to punish wrongdoers as a form of 
retribution, a policy of positive marginal incentives to set aside criminal 
activities may well turn out to be efficient under some conditions. In 
particular, this is the case if such a policy does not induce individuals to enter 
                                                
11 However, a better education also makes it easier to perpetrate white collar crime. 
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into criminal activity in order to later profit from the positive incentives to 
exit. There is evidence that such a situation exists for some gangs, such as the 
Mafia, and more importantly for terrorist organizations (see, extensively, Frey 
2004). 
B. Rewards for Obeying the Law 
Instead of punishing people for behaving illegally, persons acting legally can 
be rewarded in various ways. Individuals and firms can be commended for 
behaving as “good citizens” by handing out orders, medals, prizes, and other 
awards. In the case of taxation, for example, the tax authorities can determine 
which persons and firms have cooperated fully with them for an extended 
period, have not made any effort to exploit the law to their advantage, and 
have always paid their tax liabilities on time. Such a policy would obviously 
work only under some conditions because it could become too costly to 
reward the vast majority of people who observe the law. Moreover, monetary 
rewards for obeying social norms may weaken the norm and its enforcement 
and may gradually erode norm-guided behavior (Fehr and Falk 2002). 
 Nevertheless, such an approach should not be rejected out of hand. As 
the awards are nonmaterial in form, they are not costly, but they may provide 
substantial benefits in terms of reputation and recognition to the recipients.12 A 
major advantage of such a policy is that it promotes a positive sum game 
between the state and the citizens, whereas reducing crime by using 
punishment establishes a negative sum, or antagonistic, game resulting in 
heavy costs for both sides and society as a whole. In particular, it has often 
been observed that an antagonistic tax system in which the tax authorities 
mistrust the taxpayers and, in turn, the taxpayers mistrust the tax officers 
produces high costs. In contrast, taxing procedures built on a measure of 
                                                
12 The emerging literature on the Economics of Awards more fully discusses and 
empirically analyzes these aspects; see, for example, Frey 2006, 2007; Neckermann and Frey 
2007. 
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mutual trust result in much lower costs and can be considered more efficient 
(Feld and Frey 2002). 
IV. PROJECTING A LAWFUL SOCIETY 
The following considerations are speculative and suggested as possible topics 
for future research. 
 The Economics of Crime assumes that human preferences are constant 
and not affected by the environment. Whether other people violate or obey the 
law does not influence behavior. This assumption has proven to be very 
productive, in particular, because it allows us to derive empirically testable 
propositions. 
 Recent evidence suggests, however, that most people’s behavior is 
influenced by the state of the environment. More importantly, the broken 
windows theory can be interpreted to show that individuals tend to be more 
inclined to behave illegally if the environment in which they act is disorderly.13 
In contrast, people are more willing to obey the law if they see that other 
people also do and the general environment is lawful. Such behavioral 
differences are not necessarily due to changes in preferences, but can be 
attributed to a changed perception of how risky it is to violate the law. 
 Careful and imaginative field experiments by Keizer, Lindenberg, and 
Steg (2008) suggest that preference changes may be a more appropriate 
explanation of the change in behavior induced by an orderly or disorderly 
environment. They find that if a norm-violating behavior becomes more 
common, the conformity to other norms is negatively affected. This effect is 
not limited to social norms, but has also been found for police ordinances. It 
works across different activities: if the setting is orderly (e.g., the walls are not 
covered by graffiti), people are induced to behave in a law abiding manner 
                                                
13 This statement has been controversially discussed in the literature; see, for example, 
Skogan 1990; Kelling and Coles 1996; Kelling and Sousa 2001; National Research Council 
2004. 
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also with respect to other actions (e.g., they litter less). Consequently, these 
insights with respect to the spread of disorderly behavior have been called the 
“cross-norm inhibition effect” (Keizer, Lindenberg, and Steg 2008, 1682). 
More generally, it has been well established that individuals do not wish to 
deviate from the social norms that they consider to be prevailing (see, e.g., 
Messik 1999; Cialdini and Goldstein 2004). 
 An immediate policy consequence is that a great effort is made to keep 
the environment orderly. According to the broken windows theory, the 
damage visible by illegal behavior, such as damaged buildings, graffiti, or 
litter, must be cleared away as quickly as possible. Such a policy only makes 
sense if the cost of removing the damage is not too expensive and if such 
action does not invite potential criminals to do even more damage. 
 The corrective policy is easy to undertake when the damage is 
immediately visible as is the case with damaged buildings or littering.14 
However, in many cases, the state of the environment is not directly visible. 
For example, petty crimes (such as stealing handbags) are rarely, if ever, 
directly observed. The same holds even more strongly when a person evades 
taxes. Other people cannot directly observe such behavior; an indirect 
indicator at best would be individuals having more disposable income than 
they likely would have if they paid their taxes. For that reason, signals become 
important: the government should make an effort to project the image that 
people live in a law abiding society. The political decision makers can use 
“framing” in order to shape people’s perceptions about the kind of society they 
live in. It has been shown that individuals respond strongly to the way an issue 
is presented to them. If, for instance, a public goods game is labeled a 
“Community Game,” the participants are much more willing to act prosocially 
than when the identical game is labeled a “Wall Street Game” (Liberman, 
                                                
14 A similar idea has been proposed by Frey and Rohner (2007) as an antiterrorism policy. 
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Samuels, and Ross 2004).15. It must be emphasized that we are not suggesting 
that the government should provide biased data on the state of a society. Such 
a policy would not only be morally wrong, but would also risk being 
counterproductive. If the media detects such an attempt, which would likely be 
the case in an open society, people would probably believe that the situation is 
indeed worse than it is in reality. 
 Consider the case of taxation. If the government constantly keeps 
informing the public that there are individuals cheating on their taxes, people 
start to believe that cheating on your taxes is an important issue and that a 
large share of the population is involved. According to the broken windows 
theory, this induces honest taxpayers to try to cheat on their taxes. This may 
start a downward spiral of ever-increasing tax evasion. However, in actuality, 
only about 5 percent of taxpayers are cheaters (see Slemrod and Yitzhaki 
2002; Cowell 1990). If, on the other hand, the government projects the image 
that most people are honest taxpayers, individuals become aware that they live 
in a law abiding society. This environment provides them with the motivation 
to follow the others and to pay their taxes honestly. 
 The possibility of framing the state of the society by the government as 
a law abiding society depends a lot on the media. Following the early insights 
of Lippmann (1922/2004) that what people know about the world around them 
is mostly the result of secondhand knowledge provided by the media (in his 
time, it was newspapers and radio). Thus, people “often respond not to events 
or social trends but to reported events” (Page and Shapiro 1992, 340). More 
recently, the views of the public are strongly influenced by what appears 
during the evening news on television. 
 Experimental evidence also suggests that “people who were shown 
network broadcasts edited to draw attention to a particular problem assigned 
greater importance to that problem—greater importance than they themselves 
                                                
15 For more experiments showing the effect of framing (and of other choice anomalies) on 
decisions, see Hogarth and Reder 1987; Quattrone and Tversky 1988; Dawes and Hastie 1988; 
Thaler 1994; Lindenberg and Frey 1993. 
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did before the experiment began, and greater importance than did people 
assigned to control conditions that emphasize different problems” (Iyengar 
and Kinder 1987, 112). While the news media have considerable influence 
over what and how they report,16 public affairs news nevertheless is 
significantly affected by governmental agencies. Indeed, it has been argued, 
“in most matters of public policy, the news agenda itself is set by those in 
power” (Bennett, Lawrence, and Livingston 2007, 54; see also Nacos, Bloch-
Elkon, and Shapiro 2008, 3). While the government cannot simply project an 
image of a society obviously at odds with what people experience, framing the 
state of a society as law abiding rather than lawless is likely to systematically 
affect the behavior of individuals. 
V. OVERCOMING THE PUNISHMENT FOCUS 
This paper argues that the Economics of Crime concentrates too much on 
punishment as a policy to fight crime. To mainly or even exclusively rely on 
punishment (as a large part of the economic literature implicitly and often 
explicitly does) is unwise for several reasons. An important, but generally 
neglected, reason is that punishment involves a negative sum game—both the 
perpetrators and the honest people loose. Moreover, there are important 
instances in which punishment is unable to reduce crime. Relying too much on 
punishment is also unwise because several feasible alternatives to punishment 
exist, such as providing positive incentives or handing out awards for law 
abiding behavior. These alternative approaches have the advantage of creating 
a positive sum environment. Yet, another policy to fight crime is based on the 
government framing the image of the society. When people are made aware 
that they live in a society, which to a large extent is law-abiding, they are 
motivated to observe the law. 
                                                
16 For instance, according to the principle of “bad news is good news.” 
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 The political economy of these proposals is left for future research. It 
must be taken into account that if the government undertakes such “positive” 
policies, in particular, by framing issues to project a law abiding society, the 
opposition has an incentive to inform the public about the extent of crime in 
that particular society. The task is to identify the conditions that determine the 
resulting political equilibrium. This equilibrium can be further influenced by 
the media, which is typically prone to emphasizing deviations from prevailing 
social norms—that is, inclined to report or even exaggerate criminal activity. 
 The basic argument of this paper is that it makes sense to use the whole 
spectrum of possibilities to fight crime and not to focus only on punishment. I 
certainly do not argue that punishment should never be applied. However, one 
should not ignore the fact that crime is significantly deterred by higher 
clearance and conviction rates, while the type (fine, probation, or 
imprisonment) and severity (length of prison sentence or amount of fine) of 
punishment are often small and insignificant (see Entorf and Spengler 2008). 
What is needed is a better, empirically supported knowledge of the conditions 
under which the various policies are more or less effective. So far, the 
Economics of Crime has only a limited knowledge of the relative advantages 
and disadvantages of the various policies. Hopefully, it will turn out that 
where one approach works too little (as pointed out for punishment), another 
approach will work much better. In any case, it is time for the Economics of 
Crime to move beyond the strong, and often unique, focus on punishment to a 
broader view of how to contain illegal activities. 
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